USAID/HAITI OPERATION BOUNCE BACK: POST-HURRICANE GEORGES RECOVERY PROGRAM

Special Objective and Package Document

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Objective of the Program

The objective of the program is to reduce the exacerbated poverty caused by Hurricane Georges in southern Haiti and the sub-objective is to build the disaster response capability of local communities in order to mitigate the impact of future natural disasters.

Problem Statement

During the last year, the Haitian people have suffered greatly. Hurricane Georges did inestimable damage to an already vulnerable physical and economic environment further destabilizing this fragile democracy.

No longer simply the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is now among the very poorest in the world. According to the World Bank, Haiti has the highest percentage of people living in extreme poverty of any nation in the world. Widespread poverty, exacerbated by extensive erosion and inadequate investment in productive infrastructure, is even more prevalent in the rural areas where 65% of the Haitian population lives and where eight out of every ten people cannot meet their minimum caloric requirements. Per capita income is estimated at $226 per year in constant 1987 US dollars.

The night of September 22-23, Hurricane Georges added to that burden when it swept across the country from the central area to the northwest damaging millions of dollars worth of crops, infrastructure and housing in its path. In addition, heavy rains fell on the major watersheds in the southeast and southwest, causing severe flooding across the entire southern claw of the island. Direct damage to crops, housing, agricultural infrastructure and livestock, as well as lesser damage to schools, agricultural inputs, and water and sanitation facilities totaled $90 million. According to the FAO and World Bank, indirect and secondary losses due to goods not produced and services not provided (and the impact that this has on the macro-economy) will rapidly double this amount to $180 million or 5% of GDP. This does not take into account the cost of environmental damage from soil erosion and flooding.

Although $180 million of total damage may seem relatively low compared to other Caribbean and Central American nations that have recently experienced hurricanes, the extreme vulnerability of the Haitian population means this disaster has pushed an already vulnerable population over the brink. According to conservative estimates from the Ministry of Interior, more than 300,000 people lost everything they had. Another 1.4 million suffered some level of damage to their housing, crops and other assets. A detailed description of damage follows.

Part of the difficulty in obtaining precise estimates of the damage stem not only from the weakness of GOH disaster response capabilities but also from poor levels of institutional abilities at the local level. Most Haitian local government and community organizations are unable to adequately assess damage, provide emergency relief of any kind, but even more critically, lack the training and resources to undertake prevention measures that would reduce the impact of natural disasters (e.g., regular maintenance of soil conservation structures on strategic catchment areas, early warning to endangered populations, etc.).

Damage to Agricultural Production

The hurricane-force winds stripped fruit and coffee trees in some of the best production areas of the country. Rain and flooding destroyed trees, crops and livestock. The FAO estimates that a total of 80,000 hectares of agricultural lands were destroyed, with losses of beans, rice, bananas and corn accounting for 70% of the total losses. The value of these crop losses reaches $53 million. Livestock is the traditional "savings account" of most rural households; over 70,000 heads of cattle, horses, pigs and small ruminants as well as 100,000 fowl were lost worth $6 million.

Damage to Infrastructure

According the FAO, severe damage to agricultural infrastructure occurred not only in the direct path of the hurricane but in critical watersheds. Rain and flash flooding eroded unprotected hillside farmlands, destroyed erosion control structures, and decimated or filled in irrigation systems. In many cases, productive agricultural land was completely carried away or covered with a heavy layer of gravel and rock. Potable water systems were destroyed or contaminated resulting in severe threats to public health from water-borne diseases.

Early FAO estimates of damage to rural infrastructure total over $9 million. For example, 1,950 cubic meters of dams, 530 km of irrigation canals, 1,400 km of farm-market roads, and 4,700 cubic meters of erosion control structures were lost. Five aqueducts and three pumping stations were totally destroyed. Over 9,000 meters of river bank were washed away endangering roads, homes, and resulting in the loss of neighboring agricultural lands. Riverbeds and gullies are now over five times wider than before the hurricane. The damage to more expensive urban infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, is equally significant.

Impact on Food Security

This damage to the agricultural sector came at a time when GDP in the agricultural sector had experienced 6% growth last year. This growth was largely due to widespread abundant rains which resulted in excellent harvests of cash crops on medium-sized and commercial farms. The 600,000 small farmers in Haiti and their families who possess less than two hectares of land are in a much more precarious position. Since the political crisis of 1991, the rural economy has

been progressively de-capitalized, forcing poor Haitians to live from day-to-day and leaving few or no reserves for coping with a shortfall. For example, crops destroyed during the growing season force an expensive re-plant if there is time or a missed season if there is not. Given the poverty of most Haitian farmers, one can foresee the loss of a third season as families resort to eating seeds instead of planting. The IMF already estimates that growth in the agricultural sector will be a mere 2% in FY99, but this growth will not occur in the areas hardest hit by the hurricane.

In the absence of reliable and detailed quantitative data, it is instructive to give an example of the situation in which the rural poor find themselves. In southern Haiti, the hurricane occurred immediately after the corn harvest was concluded and safely stored. Normally, this corn would be eaten with the breadfruit which would have ripened soon after the corn harvest. However, high winds stripped the breadfruit from the trees and washed away the beans and tubers which would have been harvested after the tree fruits. Consequently, farm families, having rapidly consumed their corn and bereft of livestock to sell or slaughter, soon found themselves with nothing to eat.

Of course, those families with cash can purchase food; however, within six weeks of the hurricane, local foodstuffs were no longer available in the affected areas, forcing residents to purchase imported commodities such as corn, rice, bananas, sorghum and charcoal at inflationary prices. For example, in various rural areas ranging from the southeast to just outside the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, corn prices rose from 35-100%; rice prices rose 17-40%; the price of bananas increased 25-56%; sorghum prices skyrocketed to 183% in some locations; charcoal prices rose 33-100%. Families living on the edge of extreme poverty are simply not equipped to absorb price increases of this magnitude.

Environmental Damage and Impact

The disastrous state of environmental degradation in Haiti has already qualified this nation as the first "eco-catastrophe" of the hemisphere. Only 1.5 percent of the country's natural forest remains, and 25 of its 30 watersheds are denuded. The deforestation of Haiti's mountains has resulted in extensive soil erosion, washing away about 15,000 acres of top soil each year, causing dams, irrigation canals and roads to lose their useful life. Three million metric tons of topsoil per year flow out of the Riviere Gris alone. Another 24 of the country's 30 watersheds are in equally bad shape.

Hurricane Georges exacerbated the process of environmental degradation that has been occurring for many decades. According to UN sources, the rains washed soil from hillsides leaving less to withstand future heavy rains and less to cultivate. In fact, the sediment load of these principal rivers during Hurricane Georges was four to five times the level during a normal rainy season. This soil, along with sub-soil and rock, either covered good soil in lower elevations or was washed out to sea and settled on the coral reefs that provide the habitat for most of the seafood consumed by Haitians. Rapid runoff from the degraded watersheds deposited rubble on existing riverbeds, diverting water and, in some cases, rending former water sources inaccessible.

Numerous potable water systems in both mountain villages and small coastal towns were destroyed by run-off. Many springs were covered by mudslides and are now inaccessible to the population and many of those that remain are now polluted.

Government of Haiti Response

In Haiti, responsibility for disaster preparedness and relief is shared by two agencies: the Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP) and the Pre-Disaster and Relief Organization (OPDES). Immediately after the disaster, OPDES helped in the estimation of damage and supplementary food requirements. Though the DCP's mandate was to coordinate the overall disaster response, it was forced to assume direct responsibility for distribution of food and clothing for immediate relief. The immediate response by the GOH emphasized the provision of temporary shelter in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Leogane, Gonaives and St. Marc accompanied by food and relief supplies for the shelters. Additional food, relief and medical supplies were provided to families who remained in their communities. Throughout this process, it became evident that the GOH had very limited institutional capability to cope with national disasters.

Recognizing that this initial infusion of aid barely began to address the needs of the hurricane victims, the GOH established an inter-ministerial committee headed by the acting Minister of Planning which drew up a plan for rehabilitation and reconstruction amounting to approximately $43 million. Recognizing that donor contributions were unlikely to cover the entire $180 million worth of damage, this $43 million plan attempts to address the most severe damage to agricultural infrastructure and the environment. In an attempt to ameliorate the tenuous food security situation in the country, the plan appropriately emphasizes the reactivation of agricultural production. To-date, the IDB has pledged $8 million, Canada has provided a $2 million grant and the GOH Treasury has pledged an additional $4.5 million.

Moreover, the plan assigns specific regions of the country to different donors based on their historical presence in the area. For example, the GOH asked the IDB to concentrate their efforts on the Artibonite while USAID focuses on the southern part of the country.

USAID's strategic interests coincide with the GOH request to focus on the southern part of Haiti as:

- this is one of the hardest hit regions in the country;
- USAID has historically undertaken major development programs in the south and southeast;
- reconstruction efforts would protect our interests there in the on-going coffee, hillside agriculture, artisan support and agriculture infrastructure such as irrigation and soil conservation;
- democracy and governance programs already on-going in this region ensure that large amounts of community participation can be expected;

- major US PVOs, with a successful methodology for agriculture and environmental activities, provide a sound basis from which to quickly launch the reconstruction efforts in this region.

The Mission would like to retain the flexibility to respond to specific requests for assistance outside the southern part of Haiti in response to extreme hardship or when required to complement another on-going USAID project.

Efforts To-Date

In the weeks following the hurricane, USAID/Haiti worked closely with the GOH's "Committee Georges" to prepare damage assessments and develop a comprehensive relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction program.

Within a month, we provided more than $1.2 million for emergency relief supplies, food and control of vector-borne diseases. To-date, 25 rehabilitation activities have already been funded. These activities include the provision of seeds and plantain cuttings and the repair of rural roads, irrigation systems and erosion control structures. USAID's rehabilitation activities have emphasized opening roads, cleaning irrigation canals, and replenishing seed and tool banks to rebuild communities. The requested $9.8 million in supplemental funding constitutes an important contribution to the program. The IDB has pledged $8 million for reconstruction activities in the Artibonite, $2.5 million of which has already been programmed. The IMF provided the GOH with $20 million in additional budget support in order to assist the government to absorb costs associated with hurricane relief and to compensate for lost revenue due to reduced economic activity.

The Reconstruction Strategy

The USAID reconstruction strategy addresses the acute conditions of poverty caused by the hurricane in the southern part of Haiti while the GOH and other donors focus on other areas. At the same time, this strategy is building and strengthening local capacity to prepare for and respond to future natural disasters. In so doing, activities under this Special Objective will address each of the constraints outlined in the problem statement. For this reason, the proposed activities will be grouped under five Intermediate Results designed to provide immediate relief, restore pre-hurricane agricultural production levels, rehabilitate productive infrastructure, ameliorate damage to the environment and enhance communities' capacity to respond to future disasters.

The entire reconstruction strategy will be based on a community self-help methodology. Lessons learned from previous emergency programs indicate that community participation, especially on the part of women, is essential to community and GOH acceptance of interventions and build the foundation for community-based disaster preparedness. These activities will emphasize the application of true consultation and participation with civil society and local government in order

to strengthen their ability to work with each other to solve community problems. Activities will embrace this principle from planning through implementation, including monitoring and evaluation.

This community-based methodology has been tested and proven effective by our environment and hillside agriculture grantees and is one of the main reasons our agriculture and environment programs were so successful, particularly in FY98. Moreover, we intend to implement these community programs through a subset of the same grantees who now implement our activities under the Mission's income and environmental strategic objectives, all of whom have extensive experience working in their respective target areas. In this way, hurricane reconstruction activities will be reinforced by ongoing agriculture, environment and economic growth activities in the hardest hit areas. In cases where the Mission finds it necessary to extend activities to zones not currently covered by its portfolio, grantees will be asked to expand those target areas contiguous with their current geographic zones of emphasis in order to minimize the management burden and build efficiently onto their existing management structures.

The multifaceted approach outlined below will be implemented in an integrated way. Based on damage assessments, problem identification and prioritization at the village level, communities will implement a package of agricultural, infrastructure and environmental interventions specifically tailored to their circumstances and needs. For example, some communities will benefit from the distribution of improved planting material, rehabilitation of productive infrastructure and soil conservation measures. Other communities may not require the restoration of their irrigation system but may need help repairing a potable water system, school or a farm-to-market road. In all cases, local capacities to better respond to the impact of future disasters will have to be reinforced.

The Results Framework contained in an Annex IV establishes indicators and targets for the Special Objective and each of the five Intermediate Results. A detailed discussion of each of the Intermediate Results follows. It should be noted that the assumptions critical to the success of the overall program and the five IRs are as follows:

1. The US Congress makes sufficient funds available to USAID to finance the activities described in the Plan of Action;
2. These funds are provided in a timely fashion;
3. Security conditions do not deteriorate to a degree that implementation suffers;
4. Haiti does not experience additional major national disasters during the implementation of this program.

The Special Objective: Hurricane Georges Recovery Program

In order to accomplish our goals of reducing the exacerbated poverty brought about by Hurricane Georges and help Haitians more adequately respond to future disasters, the GOH and USAID

have chosen to focus on reactivating the agricultural sector to restore production to pre-hurricane levels. Three of the following five Intermediate Results contribute directly to this objective.

Through the provision of improved planting material, combined with related extension services, the rehabilitation of productive infrastructure and the promotion of environmental protection measures, the Mission hopes to impact on 10,500 hectares. We expect to restore irrigation systems to provide water to 3,000 hectares which are expected to produce 1,500 metric tons (mt) of beans and 40,000 metric tons of bananas. Improved planting material and watershed management should lead to the production of 12,000 metric tons of corn on rain-fed hillsides. It is thus estimated that within a year of planting, revitalized agricultural production will be valued at more than $13.5 million. While the program will encompass the restoration of cultivation of cash crops like coffee and mango, we have chosen these basic food crops as indicators of restored production overall due to their importance for the food security of the average Haitian household.

IRs 1 and 5 refer to the immediate relief needs of the country and to the need to improve disaster planning at the community level. A detailed description of each IR follows.

Intermediate Result One:

Mitigation of Life Threatening Conditions

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Georges, nearly one million poor people faced the prospect of varying degrees of undernutrition due to the loss of food crops, livestock and their capacity to make a living. These families, predominately subsistence farmers, are located in rural and peri-urban areas. The principal objective of the relief phase was to provide shelter, food, water and medical care to the victims of the storm in order to minimize the loss of life and human suffering.

During the relief phase (now completed) the USG contributed $1.2 million worth of supplies such as plastic sheeting for shelters, water-containers, and funds for the emergency distribution of potable water in the amount of $100,000. Army tents and the 200 rolls of plastic sheeting distributed provided shelter to hundreds of families and temporary shelter to replace damaged schools.

USAID also made a $300,000 grant to the Pan American Health Organization to provide basic medicines and lab equipment and undertake the monitoring of vector and water-borne diseases in the Artibonite Valley in order to enable the GOH to take immediate action in case of an epidemic. The entire population of the valley, or 285,000 people, benefited from improved disease surveillance.

Title II food resources valued at $850,000 were used to feed more than 16,000 families (approximately 96,000 people) who fell victim to the hurricane during the immediate aftermath of the storm. Our current Title II Cooperating Sponsors (CARE, ADRA, and CRS) carried out the food distribution program.

Approximately one-half of this relief was targeted to the southern half of the country. USAID's contribution formed part of a multi-donor response. Other major contributors included the GOH, which provided $300,000 worth of food, the governments of Canada, France, Japan, Switzerland, Germany and Taiwan and the UN institutions, all of which provided cash assistance amounting to nearly $1.1 million.

Intermediate Result Two:

Restoration of Food Production

The major elements of this activity will reactivate the household economies of those targeted areas, primarily in the southeast and south, where 3,000 hectares of irrigated land were damaged and where very little production has taken place since the flooding. This activity will also provide assistance to approximately 15,000 hillside farmers (7,500 hectares).

The elements are: 1) provision of higher-yield crop varieties; 2) production and multiplication of foundation and commercial seeds; 3) rudimentary but improved post-harvest processing and storage; and 4) provision of short-term technical assistance and technology transfer. We will closely monitor, as production activities are implemented, the potential need for improved soil fertility and pest control measures to complement the high-yielding varieties.

Lessons learned from our recent Hillside Assessment show that community-based, peasant extensionist systems are cost effective. This is the approach used in all activities in conjunction with specialized technical assistance.

The sites chosen have been identified as our geographic focus based on damage assessment, community requests, absorptive capacity and our own managerial capacity. The productivity-enhancing activities will include (as discussed below) restoring about 3,000 to 4,000 hectares of irrigated land which was severely damaged. This IR will be coordinated with results in IR3.

There is currently only one Haitian NGO, the Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE) that produces foundation and commercial seed in Haiti. USAID will award a grant to ORE to rebuild the nation's stock of high yielding varieties of corn, bean and other planting material including banana, yam, and cassava. It has in stock enough high-yielding bean seed to immediately cover about 400 hectares. It also has 150 mt of improved maize to cover 7,500 hectares. The southeast irrigated perimeters on the average produce about 50% banana, while in the south, grain and bean are the dominant crops.

This activity will address two major problems surrounding the question of seeds in Haiti: the recurring problem of scarcity (following natural disasters such as Hurricane Georges); and the destitute farmers' need for commercial quality seeds adapted to local conditions (e.g., rainfall levels). This activity will increase seed availability and will produce a stock of about 700 metric tons of commercial corn and bean seed which will be made available to farmers during a two-year period. The activity will also increase the foundation and basic seed in order to cover the production of up to 1,400 mt of commercial seed in case of emergencies. The Center for Tropical

Agriculture (CIAT) will reinforce ORE to produce, multiply, provide quality control and to assist in the transfer of the improved planting material.

Another activity, which will be funded soon, outside this program but complementary to it, and currently is a component of our large Hillside Program, is the fruit tree-grafting activity designed to respond to the serious fruit tree damage created by the high winds and flooding. This program will begin in May and proposes to top graft about 500,000 mango, avocado and other fruit and spice species. Approximately 40% of these trees will be grafted in the south and southeast target zones of the Recovery program.

In addition to previously funded activities supporting this area, another portion of the $9.8 million supplemental is targeted for the reproduction and distribution of seed and farmer extension services.

Intermediate Result Three:

Restoration of Productive Infrastructure

The major thrust of this program element is to assist those communities hardest hit by Hurricane Georges to rebuild damaged infrastructure which hampers agricultural production, marketing, and, to a lesser degree, controls future flood and erosion control. In order to assist the rural population to recuperate from the devastation of Hurricane Georges, the Mission proposes to build upon and expand a community self-help program which will enable local communities and local governments to prioritize, select and implement small projects designed to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure. This program will provide technical management assistance and equipment. In some portions, the Title III Program may provide the local cost financing required to rehabilitate primarily tertiary roads, irrigation and drainage canals, river bed corrections, soil and water retention structures, as well as potable water systems.

On-site heavy equipment recently provided by the US DOD Support Group will be deployed in support of these projects in order to execute the tasks beyond the means of these communities or to help them reach their goals more rapidly and efficiently.

This activity will benefit both rural and urban residents by contributing to improved agricultural production, market access and public health. By the end of the program, we will have restored irrigation systems bringing water to 3,000 hectares of land which provide a livelihood to approximately 18,000 people. We will have repaired at least 150 kms. of strategically selected farm-to-market roads and repaired potable water systems in both isolated rural communities and market areas. Additional details on projected field activities are found in Annexes I and II. It is estimated that direct beneficiaries of these infrastructure efforts will benefit over 275,000 people.

Intermediate Result Four:

Reduced Environmental Impact of Future Disasters

Hurricane Georges accelerated the already severe degradation on the watershed hillsides. Damage from the run-off of rain in particular was responsible for most losses and damage recorded to both agricultural production and rural infrastructure. In the absence of vegetative cover, rainwater will not penetrate the water table. Instead, it will rush down hillsides as destructive floods. At the same time, lower water table levels mean less soil moisture content and, therefore, lower agricultural productivity. This causes an apparent paradox; increased desertification in areas with rainfall – a condition known as pseudo-drought. Yet, nowhere in the country was the impact of sound environmental management practices more visible than on Haiti's fragile hillsides. In many areas hit by the hurricane, fields belonging to farmers who used sound soil management practices suffered far less damage.

In view of the above, this IR will emphasize the protection and improved management of hillsides which form part of the watersheds most vulnerable to future tropical storms. Illustrative field activities include terracing, weirs, rock walls, gully plugs, and improved crop cover management for more complete vegetative coverage. This work will be accomplished by communities in conjunction with the Operation Bounce Back team. Fruit tree orchards will be encouraged to improve income and act as windbreaks.

In the vast majority of cases, soil and/or water management activities will be undertaken in specific regions in conjunction with other infrastructure rehabilitation efforts, in order to decrease the chance that future hurricanes will inflict further damage to agricultural infrastructure. In essence, if run-off and flooding can be minimized, the next time a storm hits, less damage will accrue to irrigation structures and water sources down river.

Technical proposals already received from local community organizations enable us to project that 730 hectares of strategically selected catchment zones will be put under improved soil protection practices and 35 kms. of ravines will be protected from erosion, run-off and flash flooding through the construction of gully plugs.

Intermediate Result Five:

Increased Local Capacity within Haiti to Deal with Recurring Disasters

The perverse synergy of overwhelming poverty, degraded environment, and lack of infrastructure makes Haiti a "disaster prone" country. Nearly every year, large segments of the population suffer from either prolonged drought, frequent floods, or mudslides. As economic conditions deteriorate and the capacity of the Government to deliver public services remains weak, deteriorating environmental conditions will make productive agriculture more difficult. This results in larger and larger segments of Haitian society losing the coping capacity necessary to deal with natural disasters. This coping capacity must be strengthened to mitigate future damage and to protect the results from this and other geographically-related programs.

Activities under Intermediate Result 5 will follow a multiple-pronged approach:

- direct community support in the planning, implementation and subsequent maintenance of rural infrastructure, irrigation canals and drainage structures and soil and water conservation interventions. Nearly fifty-thousand person months of volunteer labor, and in some cases construction materials, will be provided through the inclusion of communities in these self-help activities. The value of this local investment is estimated at US $4 million.
- nearly 350 local level civil society organizations will be involved in the planning and execution of these reconstruction efforts designed to restore productive infrastructure, restore agriculture production, and reduce future environmental degradation from hurricanes.
- workshops will be conducted and both formal and informal training will be supported for CSO in the following areas:
  - damage assessments
  - vulnerability analysis
  - preparedness planning and evaluations
  - early warning strategies
  - public information dissemination
  - reinforcement of local capacity to regularly maintain productive infrastructure
  - management of community tool banks.
- In conjunction with a non-governmental organization, USAID will work with representatives from other NGOs, government and private sector to identify critical elements required to develop national capacity to deal with disaster preparedness and response.

USAID is coordinating these efforts closely with Peace Corps, who have detailed a "Disaster Corps Volunteer" to work in the southern portion of Haiti. USAID is discussing how best to integrate the work done by Peace Corps, the OFDA sponsored Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP) and the community self-help component of the USAID recovery program.

In addition, the Mission will request BHR/OFDA to field a team to assist USAID/Haiti in up-dating the Mission Disaster Response Plan, as well as providing technical guidance in pursuing this element of the Action Plan. It is anticipated that OFDA will be able to provide guidance in obtaining technical assistance, training and operational support for the execution of this Intermediate Result.

Expected results from these activities include:

- 350 community organizations will be reinforced;

- a network of banks of hand tools worth some $500,000 will be established in selected communities;
- appropriate training materials developed and workshops conducted;
- national preparedness and response plan developed in conjunction with other donors, appropriate NGOs, public and private sector;
- national plans shared with relevant partners in the Dominican Republic.

This element of the recovery program is expected to have ultimate impact on the entire population of southern Haiti, who will be in a better position to deal with subsequent hurricanes.

Operation Bounce Back Program Implementation Strategy

Implementation Plan and Management

Each individual IR component description elaborates the implementation arrangement. The Reconstruction Phase will build on on-going activities, without compromising procurement competition, and be geographically focused. The Operation Bounce Back program and the attendant day-to-day management responsibilities will continue under the aegis of the Economic Growth Office. An expatriate Personal Services Contractor will be responsible for managing the program at the USAID Haiti Mission. USAID FSN staff have also been assigned to management of these activities.

This team is responsible for all details of program administration. HG/SO Team members will be responsible for monitoring and coordinating the implementation of the activities described in the Plan of Action and will assure that all necessary actions are undertaken to attain the intended results. This team, comprised primarily of USAID Technical and support staff, will fulfill required USAID implementation monitoring, contract management, audit and evaluation responsibilities. The HG/SO team includes the HG/SO Team Leader, the Program Officer, one Program Manager for each major group of activities (Agriculture and Natural Resources, Water, Democracy, Health, and Engineering) as well as related support staff, including an administrative assistant, short-term specialists, the regional Contracting Officer's representative, and the Controller's representative.

The expanded Results Package Team will include representatives from the partner NGOs, and relevant other individuals who will participate and/or benefit from the activities described in the Plan of Action. This expanded Results Package Team will also include virtual team members from relevant USAID/W offices, the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. Government entities. The Results Package team leader will call coordination, review, and decision-making meetings involving members and others as necessary to achieve the planned results.

Schedule of Actions

Action	Estimated Target Date
1. PSC position filled.	May 1999
2. Spring Review of Rehabilitation activities	May 1999
3. USAID/Haiti receives authorization and funding to begin implementation.	June 1999
4. Limited Competition RFP let to Haitian based U.S. PVOs for increased agriculture production and infrastructure.	June 1999
5. Proposals request, reviewed, and grants made to ORE and CIAT for seed production, distribution and technology transfer to farmers.	June 1999
6. Grants awarded	July 1999
7. Grant awarded for monitoring & associated activities	July 1999
8. Preparedness plan reviewed	August 1999
9. USAID reviews & approved all workplans	August 1999
10. All activities are launched	August-September 1999
11. Partner workshops	Quarterly
12. Implementing partners complete implementation	2 years from grant signing

Donor coordination will be critical to maximize reconstruction investment returns. USAID will work closely with the Ministry of Interior (which oversees the Civil Protection Bureau) and the GOH Post-Georges Interministerial Committee to coordinate and integrate USAID activities into the GOH rehabilitation and reconstruction program. This committee hosts periodic donor meetings on post-Hurricane Georges reconstruction. It should be noted, however, that the GOH decision to divide up the affected areas among donors will go a long way toward avoiding duplicative or overlapping projects.

General Implementation Guidelines

All standard USAID administrative and financial management policies will apply to grantees and contractors whose services will be retained for this program.

It is recommended that a complementary set of guidelines and recommendations be annexed to the specific contracts and grants drawn between the Mission and individual implementing organizations. Most of USAID's traditional partners will already be familiar with, and have in

place many of the listed procedures, but they are worth highlighting, given their proven value and efficiency in project implementation, documenting and monitoring. They also take into account the Mission's own need to ensure homogeneity in reporting formats between subprojects and among the various implementing institutions.

These guidelines are based on lessons learned from various USAID-funded infrastructure rehabilitation projects of the past few years, including the Jobs Program and the OTI-IOM Communal Governance Program. They are based on the assumption that implementing institutions may have more than one discrete subproject to execute, and that they may have to establish distinct regional offices (or reinforce their present field structures) in order to adequately manage and supervise their approved reconstruction program over the two year program.

In summary, these general Mission guidelines include:

- Supervision of sub-projects: adequate procedures must be clearly established by implementing institutions, in order to ensure that all necessary documentation be completed before project execution, and to efficiently supervise and monitor ongoing field activities and personnel.
- Project identification and documentation: implementing institutions will have to ensure standard visual identification of Mission-financed field activities, and an adequate audio-visual or photographic documentation record of sub-project progress.
- Regional office set-up (and/or program start-up): rapid, efficient and clear procedures will have to be established by implementing institutions in order to ensure adequate managerial and technical reinforcement of regional offices tasked with program execution.
- Budget management: program and project implementation will be expected to stay within pre-approved budgets, and institutions will be required to establish a thorough accounting system for both program and sub-project management.
- Disbursement of funds and provision of building materials: as much as possible, all transactions should be made by check. Disbursements and provisions of materials should be done in tranches, as the project advances.
- Community participation: community contribution to subprojects is expected, although it may vary from case to case. Implementing institutions will be expected to ensure adequate evaluation of any such contribution.
- Reporting format: implementing institutions will be expected to work closely with the Mission in order to develop and utilize a relatively standardized reporting format.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The Mission will establish a unit to design and implement a monitoring and evaluation system for activities financed through the Operation Bounce Back program.

Rehabilitation activity monitoring will primarily be the responsibility of the implementers. During this phase, activity monitoring will record the extent to which projected outputs were surpassed or met in the quantitative sense. For example, such figures as the actual amount of seedstock distributed versus planned and the extent of community participation versus planned will be sought. Mission program management will work closely with implementers to develop standard monitoring and reporting procedures.

Reconstruction activity and overall program monitoring will be comprehensive and will be executed under the Mission's existing contract for monitoring and evaluation. The two major hypotheses to be tested are that assistance played a major role in enabling families to restore and protect productive assets lost to Hurricane Georges and that the integration and participation of local government and community groups in project activities have reinforced or helped to establish institutional arrangements aimed at enhancing local disaster preparedness and coping capacities. The monitoring will be done with the assistance of local government which will simultaneously reduce the cost of monitoring, bring municipal leaders on board with the Operation Bounce Back program, enhance their relevance within their communities, and upgrade their abilities to judge the severity of future disasters.

In addition to studying the impact of the Hurricane Georges mitigation effort on farm households, USAID will also conduct an evaluation of the program to determine how completely objectives were achieved and to assemble lessons learned. The Operation Bounce Back program will be audited at the end of FY 99 and at the end of the program in the first quarter of FY 01.

Customer Service Plan

The Customer Service Plan (CSP) is comprised of:

- The participatory design approach leading to the Plan of Action and subsequent grant proposals;
- The attendant inter-related elements of the implementation, all of which have strong Civil Society involvement;
- Transparent and effective collaboration of all partners and customers.

In order to continue to understand customer needs, USAID will maintain continuous communication with partners and the customers. The HG/SO team is committed to using various methods to reach the customers, including, but not limited to, direct methods such as household surveys, group/town meetings, and site visits, as well as indirect contacts such as rapid appraisals, evaluations, formal and informal discussions with partners.

Procurement Plan

The following procurements are planned:

- Long term USPSC for HG management and associated support (transportation and communication);
- Grant to ORE for seed production and distribution;
- Grant to CIAT for technology transfer and information dissemination to farmers;
- Limited competition grant to PVO let for support of activities with community-based organizations designed to complement the self-help activities;
- Limited competition grant to perform monitoring and document best management practices;
- Limited competition grant to undertake preparedness planning.

Environmental Considerations

The Mission has prepared an Initial Environmental Examination based on description of proposed activities and mitigative measures. This IEE recommended:

- A negative determination for activities that have no impact on the physical environment;
- A conditional negative determination for productive infrastructure (soil conservation, road/irrigation/drainage rehabilitation, and construction rehabilitation); and
- A deferred determination for activities with physical impact on the environment not already described and for any procurement of chemicals/pesticides.

ANNEX I

"OPERATION BOUNCE BACK"

List of Potential Field Projects & Estimated Beneficiaries

Identified by the OBB/USAID Technical Team

Initial List of Sites – Phase I Reconstruction		
I. Rehabilitation of Secondary and Tertiary Access Roads		
Project identification	**Length (km)**	**Department**
Marché Talon – Mare Mirande Blecke	8.00	South-East
Gaillard (Charrettes)	14.00	South-East
Thomazeau - Carrefour Beaugé	11.00	West

SUB-TOTAL	33.00	
II. Repair of small irrigation systems (dredging and repair of canals, reconstruction of structures, etc.)		
Project identification	**Surface area (ha)**	**Department**
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Deslandes system	190	West
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Despuzeau system	90	West
Dredging of canals and repairs to the right bank of the Riviere Grise system	170	West
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Anse à Pitres system	50	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Cayes Jacmel - Kajen system	50	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Passe Herlin system	60	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Palmiste Lamy system	80	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Croix Fer system	100	Central Plateau
Putting back into service the Ca Laroche system	70	Central Plateau
SUB-TOTAL	860	
III. Watershed protection - Soil Conservation		
Project identification	**Surface area (ha)**	**Department**
Soil Conservation in Colladère	150	Central Plateau
Soil Conservation in Gaillard – Charettes	90	South-East
Soil Conservation in Bois d'Orme	90	South-East
SUB-TOTAL	330.00	

IV. Rehabilitation of potable water systems		
Project identification	**Length (m)**	**Department**
Potable water system of Pérédo	1,400	South-East
Potable water system of Cayes Jacmel	900	South-East
SUB-TOTAL	2,300.00	

ANNEX II

Initial List of Sites – Phase II Reconstruction		
I. Rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary access roads		
Project identification	**Length (km)**	**Department**
Cerca la Source -Ti Lory	16.00	Central Plateau
Carrefour Casse – Marche Casse	10.00	Central Plateau
Mare Rouge (Bois d'Orme)	7.00	South-East
Jacmel – Lafond	9.00	South-East
Marigot - Corail Soult	9.00	South-East
Aviation Jacmel – Cap Rouge	11.00	South-East
SUB-TOTAL	62.00	
II. Repair of small irrigation systems (dredging and repair of canals, reconstruction of structures, etc)		
Project identification	**Surface area (ha)**	**Department**
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Morel system	200	West
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Cavaillon - Dory system	150	South

Dredging of canals and repairs to the Torbeck system	100	South
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Les Anglais system	100	South
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Orangers system	200	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Meyer system	120	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Lafond system	400	South-East
Dredging of canals and repairs to the Mayette system	50	South-East
SUB-TOTAL	1,320	
III. Watershed protection – Soil Conservation		
Project identification	**Surface area (ha)**	**Department**
Soil Conservation in Rivière Fesles	200	South-East
Soil Conservation in Bélair	75	South-East
Soil Conservation in Rivière Bainet	200	South-East
Soil Conservation in Thiottes	75	South-East
Soil Conservation in Michino	200	South-East
Soil Conservation in Saut Mathurine	200	South
SUB-TOTAL	950.00	
Project identification	**Length Km**	**Department**
Ravine Protection: Gully plugs in Ogé-Berry	15	South-East
Ravine Protection: Gully plugs in Riviere Orangers	5	South-East
Ravine Protection: Gully plugs in Savanne	5	South-East

Dubois		
Ravine Protection: Gully plugs in Belle Anse	10	South-East
SUB-TOTAL	35.00	
IV. Rehabilitation of potable water systems		
Project Identification	**Length (m)**	**Department**
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Mathieu	500	West
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Bois d'Orme	50	South-East
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Bellevue	500	Plateau Central
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Chambo	500	Plateau Central
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Dufailly	500	Plateau Central
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Thomonde	500	Plateau Central
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Enmorène	500	Plateau Central
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Bodary	500	South-East
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Cabaret	1,500	West
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Léogane	1,500	West
Rehabilitation of Potable water system of Chalon	4,000	Nippes (Grand'Anse)
SUB-TOTAL	10,550.00	
Project Identification	**Units**	**Department**

Repair to potable water cisterns	15	South-East
Repair to potable water cisterns	10	South-East
Repair to potable water cisterns	10	Plateau Central
Repair to potable water cisterns	10	Plateau Central
SUB-TOTAL	45.00	

ANNEX III

Proposed Proposal Selection Guidelines

- Soundness of proposed activities:
  - Address observed and quantified urgent needs and those that
    - mitigate near-future food insecurity at the household level,
    - either protect or rehabilitate productive assets (public and private), and
    - are feasible within the time frame given.
  - High and efficient economic and/or social return on investment.
  - High potential to prevent a future disaster.
  - Good exit strategy, with
    - no recurring costs to PVO necessary for success and
    - as few dependencies created as possible.
- Benefits of proposed activities:
  - Rehabilitation effects quantified.
  - Projected economic impact quantified, with
    - minimization of recurring costs to community.
- Fit within overall needs and response strategy:
  - Target population reached, with
    - rural and urban poor benefiting, and
    - 20 to 30 percent of activities with women as direct beneficiaries.
- Geographic area respected (primarily the Southeast and West departments).
- Minimized conflict with existing development programs.
- Culturally and socially acceptable, and

        - takes local/national power relationships into account.
    - Appropriate maximization of local participation (e.g., makes use of civil society organizations in planning, implementation and monitoring).
- Relationship to other activities in the area:
    - Those of implementors, USAID or other donors.
    - Looking for other support available to augment this activity.
- Institutional capacity of implementor in:
    - Activity management.
    - Monitoring and evaluation, including
        - survey women and women's groups and
        - use of local CSOs.
    - Audit preparedness.

ANNEX IV

Intermediate Results and Indicators

SO/ Intermediate Result (IR)	**Performance Indicator and Target**	**Data Source**
Reduce the exacerbated poverty caused by Hurricane Georges in southern Haiti	• Hurricane victims benefit from Recovery/Rehabilitation/Reconstruction efforts • Baseline: • Target: • Agricultural production restored to pre-hurricane levels as measured by selected crops • *Metric Tons of beans/corn produced* • Baseline: 0 • Target: 1,500 (irrigated) beans • 12,000 (rainfed) corn • *Metric Tons of bananas produced*	• Monitoring process by the RP Team • GOH reports • Periodic progress reviews • Evaluations • Periodic reviews of reports of activities carried out by implementing partners

	• Baseline: TBD • Target: 40,000	
Intermediate Result 1 Mitigation of Life-Threatening Conditions	• No. of people provided with food • Baseline: 0 • Target: 96,000 • No. of people benefiting from improved disease surveillance • Baseline: 0 • Target: 250,000	• Reports by C.S. and the WFP, Title II, PAHO, and OFDA • Monitoring process by the RP Team • Periodic reviews of progress • Evaluations • Reports by implementing NGOs/CBOs and USPSC.
Intermediate Result 2 Restoration of Food Production	• No. units planting materials distributed • *Metric tons of beans/corn* • Baseline: 0 • Target: 250 • *No. of banana plants* • Baseline: 0 • Target: 1,500,000 • Population benefiting directly from distribution and technology transfer • Baseline: 0 • Target: 60,000	• Monitoring process by the RP Team • GOH reports • Periodic progress reviews • Evaluations • Periodic reviews of reports of activities carried out by implementing partners
Intermediate Result 3 Restoration of Productive	• No. of kilometers of rural roads rebuilt • Baseline: 0 • Target: 150	• Monitoring process by the RP Team • Periodic

Infrastructure	• Population benefiting directly from: • *Irrigation systems* • Baseline: • Target: 24,000 • *Potable water* • Baseline: 0 • Target: 104,750 • No. of irrigated hectares returned to production • Baseline: 0 • Target: 3,000	reviews of progress • Evaluations • GOH Reports • Periodic reviews of reports of activities carried out by implementing partners
Intermediate Result 4 Reduction of Environmental Impact of Future Disasters	• No. of hectares of strategic catchment zones under improved conservation and management practices • Baseline: 0 • Target: 1,000 • Kms of ravine protection • Baseline: 0 • Target: 35	• Monitoring process by the RP Team • Periodic progress reviews • Evaluations • Periodic reviews of reports of activities undertaken by implementing partners • GOH Reports
Intermediate Result 5 Increased Local Capacity to Address Mitigation and Preparedness	• No. of local organizations involved with planning of rehabilitation/reconstruction activities • Baseline: 0 • Target: 350 • Amount of community involvement during implementation, as measured by local investment of labor provided • Baseline: 0	• NGO reports • Workplans • USAID monitoring • Periodic reviews of activity reports from implementing

	• Target: 70,000 person months	partners • GOH Reports